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JUDICIAL DECISIONS
CHESTER G. VERNIER AND HAROLD SHEPHERD
CONFESSIONS
State v. Morro, Mo., 281 S. W. 720. Necessity of independent proof of
corpus delicti in embezzlement action before confession will support verdict of
guilty.
Indictment charged defendant, while cashier of a bank, with embezzling
money. His confession was offered in evidence and defendant found guilty.
He invokes the rule that independent proof of the corpus delicti must be made
before a confession will support verdict of guilty. Held, that proof that defend-
ant was cashier of the bank, that he had received a sum of money for the bank
and had accounted for only a small part of that sum was sufficient proof -of the
corpus delicti to make the confession admissible within the rule. The court
also correctly emphasizes the fact that full proof of the corpus delicti, independ-
ent of the confession is not required, and, if there is evidence of corroborating
circumstances tending to prove crime corresponding with circumstances related
in the confession, both the circumstances and the confession may be considered
in determining whether corpus delicti is sufficiently proved.
EMBEZZLEMENT
People v. Kilpatrick, Colo., 245 Pac. 719. Contraband liqutr .,"bject of
larceny and embezzlement.
Police officers, seizing liquor and failing to account therefor to city, are
chargeable with larceny and embezzlement of liquor; C. L. Sec. 3720, not pre-
venting liquor from being subject of larceny or embezzlement.
Purpose of C. L. Sec. 3720, declaring that there shall be no property rights
in liquor and devices mentioned, when used in violation of act, is to limit civil
rights, not criminal liability.
Smith V. State, Neb., 208 N. W. 126. Conditional Vendee as Bailee under
Embezzlement Statute.
Vendee receiving a diamond ring and gold watch under a contract to keep
it for a certain time, and to become its owner then if he has paid the stipulated
price, otherwise to pay for its use is not owner under a conditional sale contract,
but a bailee subject to punishment under Comp. St. 9631 making bailees who con-
vert to their own use chattels guilty of larceny in same manner as if the original
taking had been felonious.
EVIDENCE
Brennan v. State, Md., 134 Atl. 148. Admissibility of extrajudicial confes-
sion of third party.
Extrajudicial declarations of third party not made under oath, that he com-
mitted crime charged against defendant, are ordinarily inadmissible, but in pros-
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ecution for bastardy, declarations of third person, who associated with prosecu-
trix and committed suicide on day her child was born, admitting that he was
father of prosecutrix's unborn child, and letter stating that suicide was caused
by responsibility for pregnant condition of prosecutrix, held admissible to show
that third person was father of child.
Urner and Offutt, JJ., dissenting.
ExTRADITiON
Cardigan v. Biddle, U. S. C. Ct. Appeals, 10 Fed. (2) 444. Removal of
fugitive from justice from one federal district to another.
Petitioner, a fugitive from justice, removed from federal district of Minne-
sota to District of Michigant for trial under indictment there pending, held
properly there tried, without being given opportunity to leave for offenses
charged in two other indictments, found after such removal.
In the state courts there is a conflict of authority whether a person who
has been extradited from another state for a particular offense can be tried for
any other. The Federal Courts have taken what seems to be the correct view
on principle, that a fugitive from justice, surrendered by one state upon the
demand of another, is not protected from prosecution for offenses other than
that for which he was surrendered, but may be tried for any crimes committed
in the demanding state either before or after extradition without being given an
opportunity to leave the state. (Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U. S. 537, 13 S. C.
687; Innes v. Tobin, 240 U. S. 127.) The holding in the principal case is con-
sistent with this view.
FORGERY
Pennel v. State, Ark., 282 S. W. 992. Bank, cashing forged check, is not
the defrauded party) though drawer's account at time was overdrawn.
Defendant raised a check to which the name of Pyeatte was signed as
dirawer. The indictment charged that the forging was done "with the fraudu-
lent intent to obtain the possession of the money and property of the said Pye-
atte." At the time the check was cashed Pyeatte's account was already over-
drawn. Defendant asked for an instruction based on the theory that, as Pyeatte
had no, money in the bank with which the check could be cashed, it was the
bank, and not Pyeatte, who was defrauded. Held the fact that drawer's
account was overdrawn at the time forged check was cashed does not make the
bank the defrauded party, since the drawer became liable to the bank for the
amount of the check, though overdraft was increased.
HOMICIDE
Commonwealth v. Heinlein, Mass., 152 N. E. 380. Homicide in commission
of a felony: continuance of felony.
Where all defendants were co-conspirators in robbery of car barn cashier,
the robbery continued as matter of law when one defendant, in acting as look-
out, killed watchman, whom he was seeking to put in fear in order that robbery
might succeed, though co-defendants had secured possession of money taken by
them and had left the building, as respected degree of murder under G. L. c.
265, Secs. 1, 17, 21.
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INSTIGATION
State v. Johnson, Idaho, 246 Pac. 531. Effect of illegal sale of cigarettes to
minor, where sheriff instigates the purchase.
Conviction for sale of cigarettes to minor under C. S. Sec. 8363, as
amended by Laws 1921, c. 185, will not be set aside, as a matter of public policy
because minor made purchases at direction of sheriff.
William A. Lee, C. J., and Taylor, J., dissenting.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS
United States v. Katz, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 513. Record of sales, etc., required
by Volstead Act, construed not to apply to liquor illegally made.
National Prohibition Act, Oct. 28, 1919, tit. 2, sec. 10 (Comp. St. Ann.
Supp. 1923, Sec. 10138Y2e), providing "no person shall manufacture," etc., "any
liquor without making at the time a permanent record thereof showing in
detail," etc., applies only to permittees, and failure of one unlawfully -selling
intoxicating liquor to keep such record is not a crime in itself, in view of title
2, Secs. 3, 34, of the National Prohibition Act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923,
Sees. 10138 aa, 10138y2u), Revenue Law (Comp. St. 1916, Sees. 5981-6161),
Food Control Act, Oct. 10, 1917 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919,
Sec. 3115Ye-3115yskk, 3115'1-3115ysr), and Const. Amend. 18.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting.
JUDIcIAL NOTICE
Keen v. United States, U. S. C. C., 11 Fed. (2) 260. No judicial knowledge
that "Hiome Brew" is intoxicating.
While courts may judicially know that whiskey, alcohol, brandy, gin and
other well known intoxicants are "intoxicating liquors" within meaning of the
National Prohibition Act, they do not know that "home brew" is "intoxicating
liquor" within the meaning of the Act, in absence of proof of alcoholic content.
PROBATION
Archer v. Snook, Dist. Ct. Ga., 10 Fed. (2) 567. Federal Probation Act of
March 4, 1925, K Comp. St. Supp. 1925. 10564%h-105641Ac.)
Two interesting questions were raised in the principal case relative to the
recent Federal Probation Act. The facts were briefly these: Archer was
found guilty of violating the Narcotic Laws and was sentenced by the federal
court for the District of Georgia to serve two years in the penitentiary at
Atlanta, but after serving six months thereof to be released on probation
under the act of March 4, 1925. After the expiration of six months' confine-
ment, Archer sought his release on habeas corpus. It was contended (1) that
the act was unconstitutional, as conflicting with the pardoning power, (2) that
the suspension provided in the sentence was, under the statute, beyond the
power of the court. As to the first point it was rightly held that there could be
no possible conflict with the pardoning power: "The power again is not abso-
lute, but the suspension must be accompanied by the establishment of a condi-
tion of probation. The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not
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complete liberty, and may be far from it. It is really a new mode of punish-
ment, to be applied by the judge in a proper case, in substitution of the impris-
onment and fine prescribed by the criminal laws. For this reason its applica-
tion is as purely a judicial act as any other sentence carrying out the law deemed
applicable to the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is
against the criminal law, which binds and directs the judges, or rather is out-
side of and above it. There is thus no conflict with the pardoning power, and
no possible unconstitutionality of the Probation Act for this cause."
The second point turns solely on a proper construction of the statute.
"Succeeding sentences of the law mention a variety of things which may be
required of the probationer, but imprisonment is not among them. It may come
only on revoking the probation. The court, therefore, after ascertainment of
guilt, must, with no other delays than have heretofore been permissible, either
suspend sentence and establish probation, which may, if unsuccessful, be
revoked and sentence then pronounced, or may pronounce the sentence ordina-
rily appropriate to the offense, but before it goes into execution may suspend it,
and establish in lieu of it probation, subject to revocation and execution of the
sentence later. It may, by express provision of the act, in any probation, make
the payment of a fine a condition of it, but in none may it make imprisonment
under the sentence such. It cannot, therefore, impose an imprisonment sen-
tence, and provide for its suspension and for probation after it is partly exe-
cuted. This applicant, therefore, cannot have his discharge on the attempt to
provide therefor in this sentence, but must place his case before the parole
board."
RAPE
Gaither v. Meacham, Ala., 108 S. 2. Illicit intercourse with girl under age
of consent as civil tort.
Illicit intercourse with a girl under 16 years, in violation of Code 1923,
Secs. 5410, 5411, is a civil tort to which she is incapable of giving consent, and
as to which she cannot be in pari delicto, so that her consent vel non is imma-
terial in civil action for damages.
SMENxcE
ty of Union v. Strickland, S. C., 132 S. E. 45. When jail sentences run
concurrently.
Prisoner was found guilty of selling and transporting whiskey and was
sentenced to pay a fine of $100 or serve 30 days on each charge. Held "Under
the well settled rule that where several sentences are imposed for separate and
distinct offenses they run concurrently, unless the intention that one should
begin at the expiration of the other is expressed" and that therefore, defendant
had the option of paying the two fines of $100 each or of serving 30 days
imprisonment.
SELF-INcRIMINATION-FINGER PRINTS
People v. Hevern, N. Y., 215 N. Y. S. 412. Statute providing for finger-
printing of persons arrested for felony and other offenses, violates constitu-
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tional guarantees of due process and prohibition against compulsory self-incrim-
ination.
The legislature of New York State in response to. asserted necessity for
more stringent penal laws in 1926 amended in certain important respects the
Code of Criminal Procedure, providing inter alia:
"No person charged with a felony, or with any of the misdemeanors or
offenses specified in the preceding section shall be admitted to bail until his
finger prints shall be taken to ascertain whether he has previously been con-
victed of crime. Upon the arrest of a person so charged, it shall be the duty of
the peace officer having him in custody, to forthwith ascertain his previous rec-
ord, if any, from the files and records kept in the place in which he is arrested,
and report immediately thereon, nor shall he be admitted to bail until his pre-
vious record, if any, shall be submitted to the judge, justice, magistrate or other
person empowered to admit to bail."
The purpose of the act was primarily to enable the court to fix the amount
of bail in proper relationship, not only to the crime charged, but to the defend-
ant's previous criminal career. The court in the principal case, however, decided
that the act violated the due process clauses of both the Federal and State con-
stitutions and was also violative of Const., Art 1, Sec. 6, prohibiting compulsory
self-incrimination.
TE.IU
Durbin v. State, Ohio, 152 N. E. 194. Sufficiency of verdict in embezzle-
Inent.
On an indictment for embezzlement charging the amount embezzled to be
$2,000, a judgment rendered on a general verdict of "guilty as charged in the
indictment," without stating the amount embezzled, will be reversed for the
insufficiency of the verdict under section 13691, General Code (Dick v. State, 3
Ohio St. 89; Parks v. State, 3 Ohio St 101, and Armstrong v.'State, 21 Ohio
St. 357, followed. Schoonover v. State, 17 Ohio St. 294, distinguished).
